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APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
10/532,380	04/21/2005	Claus Bischoff	10191/3897	1743
26646	7590	10/20/2009	EXAMINER	
KENYON & KENYON LLP			VANAMAN, FRANK BENNETT	
ONE BROADWAY				
NEW YORK, NY 10004			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
			3618	
			MAIL DATE	DELIVERY MODE
			10/20/2009	PAPER

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

<b>Advisory Action Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief</b>	<b>Application No.</b>	<b>Applicant(s)</b>
	10/532,380	BISCHOFF ET AL.
	<b>Examiner</b>	<b>Art Unit</b>
	Frank B. Vanaman	3618

--The MAILING DATE of this communication appears on the cover sheet with the correspondence address --

THE REPLY FILED 05 October 2009 FAILS TO PLACE THIS APPLICATION IN CONDITION FOR ALLOWANCE.

1.  The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to or on the same day as filing a Notice of Appeal. To avoid abandonment of this application, applicant must timely file one of the following replies: (1) an amendment, affidavit, or other evidence, which places the application in condition for allowance; (2) a Notice of Appeal (with appeal fee) in compliance with 37 CFR 41.31; or (3) a Request for Continued Examination (RCE) in compliance with 37 CFR 1.114. The reply must be filed within one of the following time periods:

a)  The period for reply expires 3 months from the mailing date of the final rejection.  
 b)  The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this Advisory Action, or (2) the date set forth in the final rejection, whichever is later. In no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire later than SIX MONTHS from the mailing date of the final rejection.  
 Examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or (b). ONLY CHECK BOX (b) WHEN THE FIRST REPLY WAS FILED WITHIN TWO MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 706.07(f).

Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date on which the petition under 37 CFR 1.136(a) and the appropriate extension fee have been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of extension and the corresponding amount of the fee. The appropriate extension fee under 37 CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the shortened statutory period for reply originally set in the final Office action; or (2) as set forth in (b) above, if checked. Any reply received by the Office later than three months after the mailing date of the final rejection, even if timely filed, may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b).

#### NOTICE OF APPEAL

2.  The Notice of Appeal was filed on \_\_\_\_\_. A brief in compliance with 37 CFR 41.37 must be filed within two months of the date of filing the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any extension thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e)), to avoid dismissal of the appeal. Since a Notice of Appeal has been filed, any reply must be filed within the time period set forth in 37 CFR 41.37(a).

#### AMENDMENTS

3.  The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection, but prior to the date of filing a brief, will not be entered because  
 (a)  They raise new issues that would require further consideration and/or search (see NOTE below);  
 (b)  They raise the issue of new matter (see NOTE below);  
 (c)  They are not deemed to place the application in better form for appeal by materially reducing or simplifying the issues for appeal; and/or  
 (d)  They present additional claims without canceling a corresponding number of finally rejected claims.

NOTE: \_\_\_\_\_. (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a)).

4.  The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1.121. See attached Notice of Non-Compliant Amendment (PTOL-324).  
 5.  Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s): \_\_\_\_\_.  
 6.  Newly proposed or amended claim(s) \_\_\_\_\_ would be allowable if submitted in a separate, timely filed amendment canceling the non-allowable claim(s).  
 7.  For purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a)  will not be entered, or b)  will be entered and an explanation of how the new or amended claims would be rejected is provided below or appended.

The status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows:

Claim(s) allowed: \_\_\_\_\_.  
 Claim(s) objected to: \_\_\_\_\_.  
 Claim(s) rejected: \_\_\_\_\_.  
 Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration: \_\_\_\_\_.

#### AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE

8.  The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, but before or on the date of filing a Notice of Appeal will not be entered because applicant failed to provide a showing of good and sufficient reasons why the affidavit or other evidence is necessary and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e).  
 9.  The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filing a Notice of Appeal, but prior to the date of filing a brief, will not be entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to overcome all rejections under appeal and/or appellant fails to provide a showing of good and sufficient reasons why it is necessary and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 41.33(d)(1).  
 10.  The affidavit or other evidence is entered. An explanation of the status of the claims after entry is below or attached.

#### REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION/OTHER

11.  The request for reconsideration has been considered but does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because:  
See Continuation Sheet.  
 12.  Note the attached Information Disclosure Statement(s). (PTO/SB/08) Paper No(s). \_\_\_\_\_.  
 13.  Other: \_\_\_\_\_.

/Frank B Vanaman/  
 Primary Examiner, Art Unit 3618

Continuation of 11. does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because: The arguments are not persuasive, and the arguments do not change the actual claim content. In this case, it appears as though applicant is arguing limitations to a scope vastly different from that of the actual claim recitations. In this case, applicant asserts that the combination is not valid in meeting the claims because the adaptation of transmission ratio is somehow not part of the initial map from which the inventive set-points are determined. Applicant's claims, however, do not require such an arrangement, as applicant is understood to well know. Rather - applicant's claims refer to the selection of a characteristic map only on the basis of a required electrical power, and then selecting a set point 'as a function of' the characteristic map. The choice of a transmission set ratio based on measured engine speeds easily falls within such a limitation, in that applicant's claims do not in any way actually that one map contains all setpoint information, nor do applicant's claims require that all choices of setpoints are made at one particular time. Furthermore, while applicant notes that Smit does not disclose the choice of a transmission ratio based on electrical power, it appears as though applicant is attempting to attack the reference on its own, even though the rejection is based on a combination of references, and still further, applicant is reminded that there is no requirement in the claims that a transmission ratio is directly based on electrical power. In that Kinugasa initially teaches the choice of a map which affects engine operation is based on a required power (this was already covered in the previous office action and is not re-presented here), and that the transmission ratio determined by Smit is based on engine conditions, the combination would reasonably control the transmission operating point (i.e., the ratio) 'as a function of' the setpoint determined from one or the other of the characteristic maps. As to applicant's comments that the maps in figures 7A and 7B are 'the same', (after which applicant then refers to the differences between the maps, which is initially a very clear suggestion that they are indeed not at all 'the same') , applicant is rather pointedly reminded that the engine operating region in the two maps is materially and very notably different, and as such the two maps are very reasonably deemed 'different', at least for the fact that the engine will operate differently based on the choice of the maps. The point is moot, however since applicant's claims do not actually require the plurality of maps to be different, they only require "a plurality of characteristic maps".

Applicant's arguments are very clearly not of the same scope as the actual limitations recited in the claims.

Although the claims are interpreted in light of the specification, limitations from the specification are not read into the claims. See *In re Van Geuns*, 988 F.2d 1181, 26 USPQ2d 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1993).

*As regards reading unclaimed limitations from the specification into the claims*

From MPEP 2111:

During patent examination, the pending claims must be given their broadest reasonable interpretation consistent with the specification. *In re Hyatt*, 211 F.3d 1367, 1372, 54 USPQ2d 1664, 1667 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Applicant always has the opportunity to amend the claims during prosecution, and broad interpretation by the examiner reduces the possibility that the claim, once issued, will be interpreted more broadly than is justified. *In re Prater*, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404-05, 162 USPQ 541, 550-51 (CCPA 1969) The court explained that "reading a claim in light of the specification, to thereby interpret limitations explicitly recited in the claim, is a quite different thing from 'reading limitations of the specification into a claim,' to thereby narrow the scope of the claim by implicitly adding disclosed limitations which have no express basis in the claim." The court found that applicant was advocating the latter, (i.e., the impermissible importation of subject matter from the specification into the claim.). See also *In re Morris*, 127 F.3d 1048, 1054-55, 44 USPQ2d 1023, 1027-28 (Fed. Cir. 1997).